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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being charged with two counts of aiding and abetting trafficking in
methamphetamine, Richard Wilson exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial.  He was
found guilty as charged, and received an aggregate sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.
On appeal, in what appears to be an issue of first impression for the appellate courts in
Idaho, he asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for
aiding and abetting trafficking by represented amount (Count II), because the State failed to
establish that Mr. Wilson knew that his accomplice was representing the controlled substance to
be “one ounce” or more.  Additionally, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support
Mr. Wilson’s conviction on Count II where the State failed to establish that his alleged
accomplice affirmatively represented she was selling one ounce of methamphetamine.  Finally,
the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support Mr. Wilson’s convictions as to both
counts  where  the  State  failed  to  establish  that  Mr.  Wilson  knew  the  substance  the  alleged
accomplice sold on the two occasions was methamphetamine.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s erroneous contentions.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Wilson’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Was there sufficient evidence to support Mr. Wilson’s convictions for two counts of aiding and
abetting trafficking in methamphetamine?
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ARGUMENT
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Convict Mr. Wilson Of Two Counts Of Aiding And
Abetting Trafficking In Methamphetamine
In order for the jury to convict Mr. Wilson of aiding and abetting trafficking by
represented amount, the State was required to establish that Mr. Wilson knew that Ms. Jones was
representing the controlled substance to be “one ounce” or more.  On appeal it is Mr. Wilson’s
contention that, where the amount of methamphetamine Ms. Jones sold to the undercover officer
was less than 28 grams, in order to prove Mr. Wilson aided and abetted trafficking, the State was
required to establish that Mr. Wilson knew Ms. Jones represented the quantity she sold as “one
ounce.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.1.)  If he did not have such knowledge, he could not be guilty of
the offense, as aiding and abetting requires a community of purpose—for him to have the same
criminal intent as Ms. Jones.  Where her conviction required a representation in order to establish
an element, the amount, as an aider and abettor interchangeable with the principal, Mr. Wilson
must have had knowledge of her representation(s).
The State asserts that it “presented substantial evidence at trial that the methamphetamine
used in the transaction on April 27, 2016, weighed at least 28 grams.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.9.)
However, the State acknowledges that the methamphetamine sold on this case was charged based
on the “represented weight” theory—that the person selling it represented it to be at least 28
grams.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.9-10.)
The statute under which Mr. Wilson was charged provides:
Any person who knowingly delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly
in actual or constructive possession of, twenty-eight (28) grams or more of
methamphetamine  or  amphetamine  or  of  any  mixture  or  substance  containing  a
detectable amount of methamphetamine or amphetamine is guilty of a felony,
which felony shall be known as “trafficking in methamphetamine or
amphetamine.”
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I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4).  The trafficking statute also states that, “For the purposes of subsections
(a)  and  (b)  of  this  section  the  weight  of  the  controlled  substance  as  represented  by  the  person
selling or delivering it is determinative if the weight as represented is greater than the actual
weight of the controlled substance.”  I.C. § 37-2732B(c).
The State relied upon subsection (c) in prosecuting Mr. Wilson for trafficking, alleging
Ms. Jones represented the weight of the methamphetamine was one ounce (28.35 grams),
although the amount she delivered was less than twenty-eight grams (25.91 grams).  (R., pp.7-8.)
At trial, the jury was instructed as to the elements of Count II:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Aiding and Abetting Trafficking of
methamphetamine as charged in Count I, the state must prove:
1.  On or about April 27, 2016
2.  in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant aided and abetted Regina L. Jones in the delivery of
methamphetamine,
4.  the defendant knew it was methamphetamine, and
5.  Either:
(a) the quantity delivered was at least twenty-eight (28) grams of
methamphetamine or any mixture or substance with a detectable
amount of methamphetamine,
Or
(b) the quantity delivered was represented to be one ounce or more
of methamphetamine.
(Augmentation, p.39 (JI No. 15).) (reasonable doubt paragraph omitted).
The jury was also instructed on the representation theory:
Under Idaho law, the weight of the controlled substance as represented by the
person selling or delivering it is determinative if the weight as represented is
greater than the actual weight of the controlled substance.
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(Augmentation, p.41 (JI No. 17).)  Here, the amount sold on April 27, 2017, as charged in Count
II, was only 25.91 grams, and not one ounce (28.35 grams).  (3/1/17 Tr., p.32, Ls.1-17.)
The jury was instructed on aiding and abetting as follows:
All persons who participate in a crime either before or during its commission, by
intentionally aiding, abetting, facilitating, encouraging, and/or assisting another to
commit the crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission are guilty of
the crime.  All such participants are considered principals in the commission of
the crime.  The participation of each defendant in the crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Augmentation, p.42 (JI No. 18).)
The State relies on the Idaho Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Barraza-Martinez,
139 Idaho 624, 625 (Ct. App. 2003), to support its contention that “the state does not need to
prove knowledge of the amount of methamphetamine being trafficked to convict a principal”
therefore, “the ‘full knowledge’ required to convict someone accused of aiding and abetting the
trafficking of methamphetamine cannot possibly include knowledge of the amount.”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.18.)
In Barraza-Martinez, the defendant was charged with trafficking in 200 grams or more of
cocaine by delivery. Id.  The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the plain language of I.C. § 37-
2732B(a)(2) does not require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
knew the quantity of cocaine he delivered in order to sustain a trafficking conviction. Barraza-
Martinez, 139 Idaho at 627.
However, Barraza-Martinez is inapposite for several reasons.  First and foremost,
Mr. Barraza-Martinez was charged under the weighed quantity theory, not the represented
amount.  139 Idaho 625.  Thus, the State’s reliance on Barraza-Martinez is misplaced.  Its
rationale  ignores  one  of  the  elements  of  the  “represented  amount”  theory  of  trafficking—that
“the weight of the controlled substance as represented by the person selling or delivering it is
6
determinative if the weight as represented is greater than the actual weight of the controlled
substance.”  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.9-10) (quoting I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4)) (emphasis added).
The State acknowledges that the methamphetamine sold on this case was charged based on the
“represented weight” theory—that the person selling it represented it to be at least 28 grams.
(Respondent’s Brief, p.10.)  However, the State fails to understand that the aider and abettor
must still know (because the principal knows) the amount the principal is representing to be
selling or delivering.
Second, Mr. Barraza-Martinez, charged with trafficking as a principle, actually handled
the drugs—he gave them to the drug dealer in front of the undercover officer. Barraza-Martinez,
139 Idaho 625.  The drug dealer then gave them to the undercover officer in exchange for $6,750
in cash. Id.  As such, Mr. Barraza-Martinez had sufficient notice that it was a large quantity—he
handled the black bag containing nine ounces of cocaine, and he likely knew the actual
quantity—he was present during the conversations between the dealer and the undercover
officer. Id.  Although the facts of Barraz-Martinez are inapposite because he was charged with
the actual weight, it is clear from the facts of that case that the defendant knew the represented
amount and probably even the actual weight of the cocaine.  Here, the State put on no testimony
or evidence that Mr. Wilson touched the drugs, talked about the drugs with the undercover
officer, or ever saw the package(s) of drugs Ms. Jones delivered.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10, 18;
see 3/11/17 Trial Tr., generally.)  Logically, under the represented amount theory, what the
trafficker alleges is the weight of the drug is to be considered the chargeable amount of that
controlled substance and, thus, the knowledge (or lack thereof) of an aider and abettor as to what
the  drug  was  represented  to  have  weighed  is  required  under  the  statute.   When  trafficking  by
7
represented amount is charged, this offense does have an element of knowledge in the form of a
representation, which the principal is required to know.
Finally, a statute must give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning
the conduct it proscribes. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195 (1998).  Due process requires that all “be
informed as to what the State commands or forbids” and that “men of common intelligence” not
be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law. Id. 132 Idaho at 197 (quoting Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).  Although it analyzed the elements of cocaine trafficking
under the actual weight and not the representation theory, the Barraza-Martinez Court held the
statute was ambiguous as far as the requisite knowledge.1 Barraza-Martinez, 139 Idaho 626.
Here, the State failed to show that Mr. Wilson had any notice that Ms. Jones was dealing with a
trafficking amount of methamphetamine.  The State’s assumption that, because Mr. Wilson was
in possession of a portion of the $620 paid to Ms. Jones for the methamphetamine, he knew the
quantity of methamphetamine (or other controlled substance) Ms. Jones had sold to Detective
Phillips, is unsupported by the trial evidence.
The State also relies on another 2003 decision of the Court of Appeals, State v. Romero-
Garcia, 139 Idaho 199 (Ct. App. 2003).  In Romero-Garcia, cocaine was sold by the drug dealer
to the confidential information in accordance with the arrangements made by Mr. Romero-
Garcia. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho at 204.  Mr. Romero-Garcia was convicted of aiding and
abetting trafficking in cocaine by delivery and aiding and abetting failure to affix tax stamps. Id.
On appeal, Mr. Romero-Garcia challenged the intent element of aiding and abetting the failure to
affix tax stamps. Id.  The Court of Appeals noted that the statute did not specifically indicate the
1 As  the  State  notes,  the  elements  of  trafficking  in  cocaine  and  the  elements  of  trafficking  in
methamphetamine are essentially the same (save for the identity of the controlled substance).
(Respondent’s Brief, p.15 n.4.)
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necessary mental state, but analyzed the intent from the statute generally governing the intent
necessary to commit a crime:
I.C. § 18–114 requires that in every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or
joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence. Intent as used in that section
means not an intent to commit a crime, but merely the intent to knowingly perform the
interdicted act or, by criminal negligence, fail to perform the required act. State v. Parish,
79 Idaho 75, 78–79, 310 P.2d 1082, 1083–84 (1957); State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 737–
38, 87 P.2d 454, 460–61 (1939).
Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho at 204.  The Court concluded the failure to affix tax stamps was a
strict liability crime. Id.  However, in Mr. Romero-Garcia’s case, his criminal act was in failing
to do something the law required.   This case cannot be likened to Mr. Wilson’s circumstances,
where he was unaware of the amount Ms. Jones represented she was delivering, and the statutory
language was ambiguous as far as the requisite knowledge.2
As the State quoted, “To be an aider and abettor one must share the criminal intent of the
principal; there must be a community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking.”  (Respondent’s
Brief, pp.13-14) (quoting State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 386 (1985)).  Mr. Wilson does not
disagree.  Here, the State failed to show he had the criminal intent to deliver an ounce or more of
methamphetamine to the undercover officer where he was not involved with any of the
telephonic discussions prior to the exchange (his name was never even mentioned), he was not
with Ms. Jones when she gave the methamphetamine to Detective Phillips, and he did not make
any statements indicating he knew how much methamphetamine Ms. Jones sold.  In order to
convict a person of aiding and abetting in trafficking when the defendant is charged under the
2 Mr. Wilson has also asserted on appeal that he did not know the substance Ms. Jones was
selling was methamphetamine and Ms. Jones did not affirmatively represent the substance to be
“one ounce or more.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.16-21.)  In this Reply Brief, Mr. Wilson will not re-
state the entirety of the arguments made in his Appellant’s Brief, but will address only the State’s
contention that it was not required to prove Mr. Wilson knew the represented amount was “one
ounce or more.”
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represented amount theory, the State must prove the defendant’s knowledge of the amount
represented in order to secure a conviction.  In Mr. Wilson’s circumstances, where he was
charged with aiding and abetting trafficking by represented amount, some evidence of his
knowledge of the represented amount is necessary to sustain a conviction, otherwise he lacks the
same knowledge required to convict the principal.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Wilson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions.
DATED this 30th day of May, 2018.
__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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